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Buker: The Mosquito Fleet's Guides and the Second Seminole War

THE MOSQUITO FLEET’S GUIDES AND THE
SECOND SEMINOLE WAR
by GEORGE E. BUKER *
the navy’s role in the Second Seminole
TWar has often beenofoverlooked,
especially its impact upon the
HE SIGNIFICANCE

Seminole nation through the many naval canoe expeditions into
the Everglades during the last years of the war. Yet the fact
remains that these incursions caused the Seminole people to break
up their their war bands and resort to small family groups to
avoid the pursuing sailors and marines. Such dispersal destroyed
the Indians’ ability to maintain an effective military posture
against the United States forces in southern Florida. Once the
navy obtained proficient guides who were knowledgeable about
the Seminoles and the interior of the Everglades, the end of the
conflict was not far off.
The United States Navy’s participation in the Second Seminole War developed haphazardly. On October 29, 1835, before
hostilities had begun, Secretary of the Navy Mahlon Dickerson
ordered Captain Alexander J. Dallas, commodore of the West
India Squadron, to aid Brigadier General Duncan L. Clinch,
the army commander in Florida, when the time came to move
the Seminole Indians to the west. 1 Thus, when the news of open
conflict between the Seminole nation and the United States
reached Commodore Dallas at his anchorage in Havana, Cuba,
late in the evening of January 12, 1836, it brought an instant re2
sponse from him. During the first few months Dallas sent naval
*

Mr. Buker is professor of history, Jacksonville University, Jacksonville.

1. Duncan L. Clinch to Adjutant General R. Jones, October 8, 1835,
printed in Clarence E. Carter, ed., Territorial Papers of the United
States: Florida Territory, 28 vols. (Washington, 1932-1958), XXV, 182-84;
Secretary of the Navy (SN) to Alexander J. Dallas, October 29, 1835,
Letters Sent by the Secretary of the Navy to Officers, 1798-1868, Record
Group 45, National Archives, Washington. Cited hereafter as Off., Ships
of War.
2. William A. Whitehead, collector of customs at Key West, to Dallas,
January 11, 1836, enclosure in Dallas to SN, January 12, 1836, Letters
Received by the Secretary of the Navy from Captains, 1807-1861 and
1866-1885, Record Group 45, National Archives. Two standard authori-
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units to the east and the west coasts of the Florida peninsula to
render aid.
The Seminoles had long maintained trade relations with the
Spanish who fished along the Florida coast, and there are
references among Cuban sources to occasional crossings from the
mainland to Cuba by bands in their native pirogues. Therefore,
at the outbreak of hostilities, the army command requested that
the navy establish a blockade of the peninsula. 3 This conflict
was the only Indian war in which the United States Navy played
a substantial role.
Although the army bore the brunt of the fighting, the West
India Squadron conducted numerous small boat expeditions
along the bays and rivers of Florida in addition to its offshore
blockade. Yet Lieutenant Levin M. Powell, USN, who was among
the most active of the naval officers conducting operations along
the coasts during the early years of the conflict, led his most
ambitious expedition into the Everglades during the winter
campaign of 1837-1838 while under the auspices of the War Department.
Powell had employed Stephen R. Mallory, Dr. E. Frederick
Leitner, and William Cooley as his guides. Mallory, who lived
on Key West, was a sailing enthusiast familiar with the waters
around the Keys; Dr. Leitner, a resident of South Carolina, had
spent many years studying the fauna of southern Florida; Cooley,
a former settler on the Miami River whose family had been slain
during the opening days of the Indian war, was acquainted with
the coastal area. Not one of these guides, however, was well informed on the Seminoles or familiar with the interior of the
Everglades. 4
ties on the war in general are: John T. Sprague, The Origin, Progress,
and Conclusion of the Florida War (New York, 1848; facsimile ed.,
Gainesville, 1964), and John K. Mahon, History of the Second Seminole
War, 1835-1842 (Gainesville, 1967).
3. Secretary of War (SW) to SN, January 20, 1836, Office of the Secretary
of War, Letters Sent, Record Group 107, National Archives. Cited hereafter as SWLS. SN to Dallas, January 20, 1836, Off., Ships of War;
SN to SW, May 18, 1836, printed in American State Papers: Class V,
Military Affairs, 7 vols. (Washington, 1832-1861), VI, 440. For information concerning intercourse between the Seminoles and Cuba, see James
W. Covington, “Trade Between Southwest Florida and Cuba,” Florida
Historical Quarterly, XXXVIII (October 1959), 114-28.
4. George E. Buker, “Lieutenant Levin M. Powell, U.S.N., Pioneer of
Riverine Warfare,” Florida Historical Quarterly, XLVII (January 1969),
253-75.
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As the war continued, the Indians, who were fighting against
overwhelming odds, were driven south until they finally entrenched themselves in the Everglades. This natural stronghold,
surrounded by water and semiaquatic, dictated that the naval
forces participate more actively, but because the navy did not
have ships with shallow enough drafts, nor the money to purchase them, the army supplied the vessels, while the navy,
through the West India Squadron, provided the officers and
crews to man them.
In those days, before the practice of unified command was
prevalent, this arrangement caused considerable confusion in the
employment of this naval group, especially since Commodore
Dallas had many commitments other than the Indian war in
Florida to occupy his staff. Finally, in 1839, the two service secretaries in Washington decided that the naval forces in south
Florida should be separate from the West India Squadron and
under a naval commander whose only concern was the war in
Florida. Thus the navy’s Florida Expedition was formed. 5
When naval Lieutenant John T. McLaughlin assumed
command of the Florida Expedition in 1840 it consisted of three
schooners, the Wave, Flirt, and Otsego; five twenty-oared, singlemasted gun barges, for close in offshore patrol among the keys;
and about sixty canoes of various sizes ranging from ten to forty
feet in length, which were to be used to probe the interior. The
officers and men called their expedition the Mosquito Fleet. 6
From January to July Lieutenant McLaughlin and his second
in command, Acting Lieutenant John Rodgers, USN, led groups
of sailors and marines into the Everglades to find the Seminoles.
McLaughlin’s men developed the skills necessary to travel
through the morass in canoes. They learned how to survive in
that hostile environment, but they were unable to discover any
Indians. The only engagements which took place happened when
the Seminoles, on their initiative, attacked the sailors and marines
as they paddled and poled through the trackless wastes of that
great swamp.
5. SN to Isaac Mayo, April 5, 1839, United States Navy Department,
Records Relating to the Service of the Navy and Marine Corps on the
Coast of Florida, 1835-1842, National Archives; SW to SN, October
17, 1839, SWLS; SN to Mayo, November 18, 1839, Off., Ships of War.
6. Joseph Warren Revere, Keel and Saddle: A Retrospect of Forty Years
of Military and Naval Service (Boston, 1872), 2.
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Lieutenant McLaughlin concluded that if the war was ever
to be brought to a successful end it was imperative that his force
be provided with competent guides who knew both the Everglades and the Seminole life-style within the swamp. Thus, when
information reached him in July 1840 that a former slave had
escaped from the Indians and had turned himself in at Fort
Dallas, he canceled the Mosquito Fleet’s activities on the west
coast of Florida and sailed for the fort, hoping that he could
recruit this man to act as his guide.
Several weeks earlier a Negro had appeared before the gates
at Fort Dallas on the Miami River. He told First Lieutenant
Henry S. Burton, USA, who commanded the fort, that his name
was John, that he had been the slave of Dr. Henry Crews,
customs inspector at Charlotte Harbor, and that he had been
captured by a Seminole war party some four years earlier. During
much of his captivity, he had been a prisoner of Chakaika, who,
he averred, was making plans to attack Indian Key. John had
succeeded in escaping from his captors, and had made his way
to Fort Dallas so that he could warn the whites. 7
Chakaika and his band of Spanish Indians were well known
in south Florida. 8 Judge William A. Marvin of Key West claimed
that it was Chakaika’s band which had attacked the white settlers
living in the Miami River area on January 4, 1836, killing Mrs.
William Cooley and her three children. Further, the judge said
that Chakaika had been involved in the April 2, 1836, raid on
Charlotte Harbor in which John’s master had been killed. While
Marvin’s claims may not be substantiated, it was known that
three years later Chakaika had been one of the leaders in the
July 23, 1839, assault upon the Army trading post on the
Caloosahatchee River. Colonel William S. Harney, USA, Second
7. John T. McLaughlin to SN, August 4, 1840, Letters Received by the
Secretary of the Navy from Officers Below the Rank of Commander,
1802-1886, Record Group 45, National Archives. Cited hereafter as Off.
ltrs. Niles’ National Register, January 16, 1841; William C. Sturtevant,
“Chakaika and the ‘Spanish Indians’: Documentary Sources Compared
with Seminole Tradition,” Tequesta, XIII (1953), 51.
8. It was believed by some authorities that these Indians were a remnant
of the Calusa tribe, the original natives of South Florida. The Calusa
theory was espoused by John R. Swanton, “Early History of the Creek
Indians and Their Neighbors,” Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin,
73 (Washington, 1922), 344. Two scholars of the Seminole theory are:
Wilfred T. Neill, “The Identity of Florida’s ‘Spanish Indians,“’ Florida
Anthropologist, VIII (June 1955), 43-57, and Sturtevant, “Chakaika and
the ‘Spanish Indians,’ ” 63-64.
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Dragoons, who had commanded the twenty-seven man guard
detachment, survived, along with thirteen others. The remainder
had been killed. 9
Chakaika, according to John, planned to attack the white
settlement at Indian Key, one of the small islands in the chain
from the Florida mainland stretching southwestward to Key
West. John volunteered to lead the army to Chakaika’s island
deep in the Everglades before the Spanish Indians made their
attack.
In all probability John had been captured in the raid upon
Charlotte Harbor in April 1836; on the other hand, John may
have been one of the runaway slaves who had joined the Indians
in their fight against the whites. Many Negroes, both slave and
free, allied with the Seminoles, and they had proved themselves
to be excellent warriors. If this latter situation was true, John
could be volunteering to lead the soldiers into an ambush.
Lieutenant Burton had no way of knowing the truth; therefore,
he decided to pass the decision in John’s case up the line to
headquarters. In the meantime, he placed the black in irons.
As for the information that Chakaika planned to attack
Indian Key - it was thought preposterous that a band of Seminoles would travel out on open water for more than thirty miles
to raid an island settlement, especially since the Mosquito Fleet
was sailing in the waters about the Keys.
As soon as McLaughlin’s schooners were anchored off Key
Biscayne, he set out for Fort Dallas and a possible guide. He was
allowed to see John, and he asked many questions of the black,
which John did his best to answer. The black was overjoyed
at the prospect of being released from his chains, and he readily
agreed to McLaughlin’s proposal to lead the navy into the Everglades. He was not afraid that his information could be used
without his services, for no matter how completely he described
the route, he knew that no one would be able to find the island,
unless intimately familiar with the terrain. Therefore, he told
the lieutenant everything he wanted to know, and more.
Unfortunately for McLaughlin, Lieutenant Burton refused
to turn John over. In the end McLaughlin had to accept the
situation. However, he submitted a written request through
9. Niles' National Register, January 16, 1841.
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army channels for the black’s services. In the meantime, he decided to undertake a scouting mission based upon John’s information.
In spite of the experience of McLaughlin’s crew, made up of
seventy-two seamen and thirty-four marines from the Wave and
the Otsego, the going was slow and tortuous. The saw grass inflicted deep wounds on the arms and legs of the men as they
paddled through vast tracts of the vegetation. The small streams
meandered about making it impossible to use dead reckoning to
calculate their position. The lush semitropical growth effectively
obstructed the horizon, eliminating the possibility of using
celestial navigation to determine their location. Without a guide
the sailors and marines would never be able to surprise the
Seminoles in their Everglades retreat.
There was only one time during the seven-day trek that
Lieutenant McLaughlin could make camp on firm ground. He
came upon a small palmetto island of about twenty acres where
he was able to fix his position as twenty miles southwest of his
departure point. From this point McLaughlin made a sweep to
the north where the country was one sheet of water varying from
one to four feet deep, overgrown with grass whose tops towered
above the sweating, laboring crews. Living in such an environment demanded more from the men physically than any storm
at sea, and all hands became so fatigued from their labors that,
after traveling about the same distance to the northwest of the
Miami River as they had gone to the southwest, they had to retrace their steps back to Fort Dallas after a short and inconclusive scouting mission. 10
Still McLaughlin had satisfied himself that he was familiar
with the country around the Miami River, and he was convinced
that it was feasible to cross the Everglades, a feat not yet accomplished by white men. He determined to make a crossing
from the west coast to the east coast as soon as possible; therefore, he sent Lieutenant Rodgers, who commanded the Wave,
to Cape Romano. He intended to send the Otsego to the same
rendezvous a few days later, for by spacing his vessels he hoped
to increase the chance of surprising some Indians along the
shore en route to the cape. Yet realizing the importance of a good
10.

McLaughlin to SN, August 4, 1840, Off. ltrs.
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guide, McLaughlin decided to remain at Key Biscayne with the
Flirt until he received an answer to his request for John’s services.
Lieutenant Rodgers stopped off at Tea Table Key, a small
island about a mile or so from Indian Key where the Mosquito
Fleet maintained a base hospital. Here he added to his crew
all able-bodied men capable of manning the forthcoming venture,
except for five who were left under the command of Midshipman
Francis K. Murray to look after the hospital’s invalids.
That night, after Rodgers had departed from Tea Table Key,
Chakaika led his men in an attack upon the settlement at Indian
Key. This key, thirty miles from Cape Sable, was owned by
Jacob Housman, a notorious wrecker of the Florida Keys, who
had established a community of some seventy people on his
island. 11 The Indian raids at the opening of the conflict had
driven the sparsely settled mainland whites to the safety of the
Keys. Thus, since the early months of the war, Housman’s settlement had been the nearest American habitation to the mainland.
Not only had Chakaika crossed the thirty miles of open
waters! from the mainland in twenty-eight dugouts, but he
brought his warriors around the island to a beach on the opposite side from his initial approach. McLaughlin felt that the
Spanish Indians must have had outside aid to plan such an attack,
and this was confirmed later by Chakaika’s sister who revealed
that three Spaniards had visited them in the Everglades and had
supplied them with details about the island. 12
The braves silently beached their canoes and noiselessly
began filing among the houses. Fortunately for the settlers, one
of Housman’s workers happened to come out on his porch for
some fresh air about two in the morning, saw the intruders, and
raised an alarm. The Indians responded with war whoops and
rifle shots which further roused the sleeping whites, Most of the
island’s inhabitants managed to flee to the safety of the schooner
Medium which was riding at anchor in the harbor, but thirteen
of the villagers, including the renowned horticulturist Dr. Henry
Perrine, were killed, and most of the dwellings were destroyed in
13
the fires set by the Seminoles. At daybreak the Medium left its
11. Dorothy Dodd, “Jacob Housman of Indian Key,” Tequesta, VIII (1948),
3-19.
12. Anonymous, “Notes on the Passage Across the Everglades,” Tequesta,
XX (1960), 63; McLaughlin to SN, August 11, 1840, Off. ltrs.
13. McLaughlin to SN, August 11, 1840, Off. ltrs.; Hester Perrine Walker,
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exposed anchorage for the safety of the naval hospital at Tea
Table Key.
When Midshipman Murray learned of the attack, he quickly
jury-rigged his two four-pounder field pieces, still mounted on
their carriage wheels, to the thwarts of his two barges, and with
his crew of five, plus seven ambulatory volunteers, he set out for
Indian Key. Initially, he intended making an assault upon the
key, but after serious thought he decided that if he could shell
and destroy the Indian dugouts the war party would be trapped
on the island until reinforcements from the Mosquito Fleet
arrived. Therefore, Murray sailed directly for the beach where
the canoes were lined up.
Chakaika, grasping the situation as soon as the barges began
approaching, brought the settlement’s long guns over to the
beach to defend his pirogues. He loaded the pieces with musket
shot and opened fire first. Much of this salvo, fired at an extreme
range, rattled harmlessly off the sides of the navy barges, although one sailor was seriously wounded in the thigh.
Murray answered with his two four-pounders, which were
mounted athwartships with the carriage wheels lashed to the
seats so that the pieces could clear the gunwale. It was an awkward arrangement. He urged his sailors to load and fire rapidly
for he could see that the Indians were slow handling their pieces.
On Murray’s third salvo both guns recoiled overboard, causing
him to give up the fight and retreat before the superior numbers
and armament of the Indians. Murray returned to Tea Table
Key to prepare his defenses for an attack he felt would surely
come. He also dispatched his two barges, to the east and west,
to inform units of the Mosquito Fleet of his predicament.
The following day Lieutenant McLaughlin arrived in the
Otsego carrying a detachment from the Flirt prepared to assault
and retake Indian Key, but it was too late. Chakaika had gathered
up his plunder, including five boxes of precious powder, and,
“Massacre at Indian Key, August 7, 1840, and the Death of Dr. Henry
Perrine,” Florida Historical Quarterly, V (July 1926), 18-42; Niles' National Register, August 29, September 5, 1840. Perrine, a famous horticulturalist interested in raising tropical plants in Florida, had been
granted a township on the mainland by Congress. McLaughlin received
a letter from the Secretary of War explaining Dr. Perrine’s mission and
requesting him to supply any aid required by the doctor. SW to
McLaughlin, July 13, 1838, SWLS.
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with the addition of some small boats taken from the key, had
led his 130 or so warriors back to the mainland and the safety
of the Everglades. 14
As soon as McLaughlin ascertained that there was nothing
he could do at Indian Key, he set a course for Key Biscayne. With
John’s help, McLaughlin intended to follow Chakaika into the
swamp to revenge the sack of Indian Key. When he reached Fort
Dallas he found the army’s answer to his request. Headquarters
had informed Lieutenant Burton that under no circumstances
was John to be released from his confinement. 15 That, of course,
ended McLaughlin’s hopes for finding Chakaika’s camp in the
glades. At a later date, he bitterly complained to the Secretary
of the Navy, that “it is reasonable to believe that that catastrophe would not have occurred, had my [original] requisition
been complied with.“ 16
In September McLaughlin loaded all of his sailors and marines
due for discharge, as well as those men who were physically
incapacitated, into the Flirt and sailed north to Philadelphia for
replacements. He left Lieutenant Rodgers in charge of the Mosquito Fleet with instructions to continue operations along the
west coast of Florida.
In the meantime, Colonel Harney heard of John and he
succeeded in obtaining the black’s services to guide his force
into the Everglades after Chakaika. Harney was especially eager
because of his defeat at the hands of Chakaika a year and a half
earlier; the colonel was out for blood. Harney had openly
boasted before he left that he would bring in Chakaika’s scalp.
He also brought along a coil of new rope to hang Seminole
warriors. Harney’s command for this expedition consisted of
ninety men drawn from the garrisons at Fort Lauderdale and
Fort Dallas. The colonel borrowed sixteen canoes from the Mosquito Fleet’s marine detachment on Indian Key. This was the
force which John was to guide to Chakaika’s island in the heart
of the glades. Harney left Fort Dallas for the Everglades on December 4, 1840.
14.

McLaughlin to SN, August 11, 1840, with enclosure, Francis Key Murray
to McLaughlin, August 7, 1840, Off. ltrs.
15. Henry S. Burton to McLaughlin, August 15, 1840, with enclosure,
McLaughlin to SN, August 15, 1840, ibid.
16. McLaughlin to SN, December 31, 1840, ibid.

Published by STARS, 1978

11

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 57 [1978], No. 3, Art. 5
S ECOND S EMINOLE W AR

317

Two days later, John stated that about noon they would
reach an island used by the Seminoles as a resting spot. When
Harney came in sight of the place, he halted and disguised
Lieutenant James Lee Rankin’s men as Indians. Then, four
canoes loaded with “Indians” set out in the van for the island.
The remainder of the soldiers were to follow at some distance
behind so that only the lead canoe would be able to see the
last of Rankin’s boats. Harney’s men approached their objective
and cautiously fanned out to search for the enemy. They were
disappointed when they found that the place was empty.
At noon on December 9, the men were sprawled out resting
and/or sleeping on another island when one of the sentinels
posted in a tree-top called down that two Seminole canoes were
approaching from the opposite side. Instantly all hands grabbed
their weapons and waited for orders. The Indians were not
aware of the whites, and Harney dispatched four canoes to flank
them. The soldiers moved silently and rapidly through the tall
grass, under John’s guidance, to a point a few hundred yards
from the Seminoles before they were noticed. When the Indians
saw their enemy, they wheeled their pirouges about in order to
flee, but the army canoes seemed to leap out of the water in response.
The soldiers were about to overtake their quarry when the
Seminole canoes veered towards a dense growth of saw grass.
The soldiers began shooting at an extreme range to cut off any
escape via that route. One of the warriors was hit, disabled, and
his canoe overtaken shortly after the skirmish started. The other
dugout made it to the saw grass where it halted as its occupants
leaped out to side in the thick vegetation. However, the whites
were upon them before they could escape. Eight persons were
captured: two warriors, two women, one of whom was accidently
wounded, and four children.
After Harney had dispatched his canoes, he climbed a tree
to watch the operation, and, with a complete view of the whole
scene, the colonel shouted encouragement to his men. By the
time Lieutenant Rankin returned to base camp, Harney was
back on the ground with his rope ready. The two warriors were
hanged summarily. The wounded woman died of her wounds
the next day at noon, and she was buried on the island near the
tree from which dangled the bodies of the two braves.
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Under John’s guidance, the soldiers reached their destination, Chakaika’s island, some hours after sunup on December
11, 1840. Secure in the fastness of the glades, Chakaika had not
posted any guards, and the first indication the Indians had that
whites were in the vicinity was when the troops opened fire. The
whole camp was quickly thrown into confusion. During the
initial surprise, one warrior was killed and two were captured,
along with a few women and children.
Chakaika, who was on the opposite side of the camp from
the army’s approach, and unarmed, ran off into the underbrush with a group of soldiers in hot pursuit. The Indian, a
giant of a man, well over six feet tall, easily outdistanced all
but one of his pursuers. Private Edmund M. Hall, Second
Dragoons, dogged his prey long after the other soldiers turned
back. Finally, Chakaika stopped, turned toward the soldier, and
held out his hand. Hall killed him with one shot, took his scalp,
and returned to camp.
The next day Colonel Harney led a party out to retrieve
Chakaika’s body. En route an Indian sail was sighted approaching,
and Harney set a successful ambush for the unsuspecting Seminoles. He captured one warrior and nine women and children.
That evening Harney hanged two of the captured braves to
the same tree where he had suspended the body of Chakaika. He
spared the third warrior, Micco, so he could act as a guide. An
anonymous diarist made the following entry: “Our tent or shed
was pitched last night within a short distance of the tree on
which Chakika [sic] was suspended. The night was beautiful,
and the bright rising moon displayed to my view as I lay on
my bed, the gigantic proportions of this once great and much
dreaded warrior. He is said to have been the largest Indian in
Florida.“ 17
Besides wiping out Chakaika’s band, Colonel Harney’s expedition was significant in that it proved that with competent
guides the Americans could bring the war to the Indians anywhere in the fastness of the Everglades. In all, four braves were
killed in battle, six were captured (five of whom were hanged),
thirty-two women and children taken, and another guide obtained so that even more soldiers might penetrate the glades. 18
17. “Notes on the Passage Across the Everglades,” 63.
18. Ibid., 57-65: Niles’ National Register, January 16, 23, 1841; William
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News of this expedition spread rapidly. On December 19,
1840, Harney’s group encamped on an island within sight of Indian Key. The following day they boarded the sloop Reform to
return to Key Biscayne. On the last day of the month Judge
Marvin at Key West sent a letter to the editor of the Tallahassee
Floridian describing the results of Harney’s expedition. Eight days
later the St. Augustine News published the anonymous diary of
one of the participants of that trek. Still later, on January 16,
1841, the Niles’ National Register of Washington retold the story,
quoting from the Savannah Republican and the Tallahassee
Floridian. The following week the paper carried the St. Augustine diary story. The expedition had become national news.
Lieutenant John Rodgers heard of Harney’s success long before it made the newspapers, and he brought the Wave and
Otsego around to Key Biscayne to offer his services to the colonel
for the next trek. Harney accepted Rodgers’s offer. Later,
Lieutenant McLaughlin, who arrived in the Flirt from his recruiting voyage just three days before the joint force was scheduled to
enter the glades, added a crew from his vessel to the expedition.
He told the Secretary of the Navy that he had no choice: “The
Cooperation being necessary, from the fact that the only guides
for the Indian towns on the border of the glades, were in possession of Col: Harney.“ 19
With Chakaika disposed of, Harney now hoped to capture
Sam Jones (Arpeika), who was described by the Negro Sampson, after he had escaped from Seminole captivity: “Arpeika or
Sam Jones is regarded as a medicine-man or doctor. His advance
age . . . attaches to his advice and opinions much importance.
At the commencement of the war, he planned attacks, fired the
first gun, then retired to take care of the wounded. By certain
medicines, and prayers offered to the Great Spirit, he infused
into the young warriors a resolute daring.“ 20 His capture could
very well be the key to peace.
Micco, the Indian who had been spared on the first expedition, was the guide, while John, who had recovered from the
Harney to Walker K. Armistead, December 29, 1840, H-353, 1840,
F/W A-34, 1841, Adjutant General’s Office, Letters Received, Record
Group 94, National Archives.
19. McLaughlin to SN, December 31, 1840, Off. ltrs.
20. Sprague, Origin, Progress, and Conclusion of the Florida War, 318-19.
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thigh wound received during the skirmish on Chakaika’s island,
acted as the interpreter. Harney’s new force consisted of twenty
dragoons, seventy soldiers of the Third Artillery, sixty marines,
and ninety sailors, traveling in canoes (four or five large canoes
carrying up to ten men the remainder in smaller five-man vessels).
Micco led the force to many islands in the Everglades where
the Seminoles had been cultivating food, but the Americans
found all the encampments empty. On the morning of January 6,
a pirogue was discovered with two people in it, but it quickly
disappeared from sight. Harney ordered a pursuit hoping that
the pirogue could be intercepted, but the search was fruitless, and
after several hours the canoes were recalled.
Harney then decided to send Lieutenant McLaughlin with
eleven boats to investigate a distant island, but nothing was
found. However, on his return trip four pirogues were sighted,
overtaken, and a brief skirmish ensued. Three warriors were
killed, and one was wounded. The remaining seven Indians
jumped from their canoes hoping to hide in the tall grass. The
firing brought Harney with the remainder of his men. Soon 250
combatants were combing the area for the hidden seven, and by
nightfall five of the Indians, none of them men, had been
captured.
That evening John questioned the captives, and he learned
that they had been led by a brave named Chia who was guiding
them to Sam Jones’s band. According to John, Chia was one of
the best guides of the Everglades; therefore, the next morning,
when the Americans set out to search for Chia, Harney instructed
them to capture him alive, if at all possible.
One of the detachments, led by First Lieutenant Thomas
T. Sloan, USMC, and Second Lieutenant Edward Ord, USA,
found a trail in the high grass and followed it for five miles
before they came upon Chia’s wife in hiding. A few yards further,
they heard a rustling, and immediately several men leaped
out of their canoes to investigate. As Private William Smith,
USMC, vaulted over the gunwale, a gun exploded and he was
shot. His companions quickly pulled him back into the canoe.
Chia broke from his hiding place, all the while loading his
rifle. Sergeant Willard Searles, Third Artillery, gave chase and
closed to about five steps before Chia whirled and shot his pursuer
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point blank. Searles, although mortally wounded, did not check
his stride; he continued on after the Indian. Chia held his ground
lashing out at the sergeant with his rifle and striking a blow
which dropped Searles to his knees. The soldier, in a last burst
of strength, lunged forward to grapple with the brave. With his
arms about the Indian’s neck, Searles hung on, crying out that
he had him. Chia drew his knife and was about to stab the
wounded man when other soldiers and marines arrived and overwhelmed the brave. 21
After his capture, Chia agreed to act as a guide, and did so
throughout the remainder of the war. From the terse military
reports there is no way of knowing why Chia would act as he
did. The explanation that the experience of Micco, sole survivor of the six men captured on the previous expedition, could
be the reason is not satisfactory after some serious reflection. If
that had been the sole reason, then why did not Chia await an
opportune time to escape? The following November McLaughlin
lost two Indian guides who fled when the occasion presented itself,
and there is no indication that Chia could not have done the
same. 22 It may have been some psychological idiosyncracy of
the Seminole culture which allowed a warrior to fight hard
until taken, and then aid the enemy after being captured. In
any case, Chia became the navy’s guide, probably because
Lieutenant Sloan, USMC, led the detachment which had captured him. For whatever reason, McLaughlin now had full use of
Micco’s services.
In spite of the addition of Chia to his command, McLaughlin
borrowed Micco and John from Harney when the colonel
decided to end the fruitless search for Sam Jones. McLaughlin
wanted to cross the full length of the Everglades to check on
the remnants of the Spanish Indians who might have gathered in
the western portion near the Big Cypress swamp.
En route, Lieutenant Rodgers’s group was in the van when
an Indian canoe was sighted. The sailors quickly overtook the
craft containing a warrior, a woman, and two children, but
not before the brave, who resisted, was killed. Rodgers learned
that these people were members of Chia’s band who had es21. Niles' National Register, April 3, 1841; McLaughlin to SN, January 24,
1841, Off. ltrs.
22. McLaughlin to SN, November 25, 1841, Off. ltrs.
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caped undetected during the skirmish in which their leader had
been captured.
John, Micco, and Chia next led the Americans to Chakaika’s
island, where the bones of the chief lay bleaching in the sun.
Then the guides took the force to numerous campsites in the
vicinity, but, except for the fields of cultivated food found on
some of the islands, there were no signs of the enemy. The Mosquito Fleet’s only hostile acts were the destruction of the Indians’
food supply.
At last they entered Harney’s River to make their way out
of the glades to the Gulf coast. On January 19, 1841, they became
the first group of whites to cross the full breadth of the Everglades. The Wave and Otsego were found on their respective
cruising grounds near Capes Sable and Romano, and their crews
returned aboard. McLaughlin took the men from the offshore
barge patrol and the Flirt across the Bay of Florida to Indian
Key and thence back to their duty stations. 23
John was sent back to the army at Fort Dallas upon the completion of Lieutenant McLaughlin’s expedition, and the navy
dispatches make no further mention of the black during the
next year. Evidently the army did not use John as a guide
either, for the commanding officer at Fort Fanning on the
Suwannee River, far from the Everglades, wrote to his superior
in December that he was employing John as an interpreter. 24
In March 1841, McLaughlin had Lieutenant John Rodgers
conduct another scout of the Everglades using Chia as his guide,
while McLaughlin sailed to Mobile, Alabama, to try to obtain
recruits. Both missions failed, and so in June the Flirt headed
north once again to New York for repairs and replacements.
Meanwhile Rodgers’s activity was severely limited due to the
shortage of personnel.
Harney’s and McLaughlin’s successes in the Everglades were
so encouraging that the Navy Department decided to increase
the size of the Mosquito Fleet. Thus, when McLaughlin returned
south in the Flirt in October, he was accompanied by the revenue
cutters Jefferson, Madison, Van Buren, and a newly-built schooner, the Phoenix. All were manned by naval personnel. These additions doubled the size of the Mosquito Fleet.
23. McLaughlin to SN, January 24, 1841, ibid.
24. Sprague, Origin, Progress, and Conclusion of the Florida War, 396-98.
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Lieutenant McLaughlin made plans to cooperate with the
new army commander in Florida, Colonel William J. Worth,
and to carry out his instructions to “find the enemy, capture, or exterminate.“ 25 Therefore, early in October 1841,
McLaughlin provided five detachments to move into the Everglades from the Shark River to rendezvous at Chakaika’s island
with an army unit led by Captain Martin Burke. Under
McLaughlin’s leadership, the joint command swept the southwest section of the Everglades. 26
During November the sailors and marines scouted the northern portion of the glades from the Caloosahatchee River, across
Lake Okeechobee, and down the Locha Hatchie River to the
east coast. 27 After a few days rest, they reentered the Everglades
at Fort Dallas, and went to Prophet’s Landing to work again
with the army. McLaughlin did not bring his force back to Key
Biscayne until December 23. 28
Next, McLaughlin organized a major sweep through the
glades using two large forces: one to enter from Fort Dallas and
the other to begin on the west coast, with a rendezvous planned
for Lake Okeechobee. He asked the army commander in Florida
for guides, since their sole guide was Chia. If the army failed to
furnish guides, “we should be wandering in the dark, and
perhaps defeat the very object we have in view, by blundering
along, exposed to sight when we should be concealed.“ 29
Colonel Worth provided the additional guides. At the same
time he began redeploying his units to the north leaving the
Everglades to the Mosquito Fleet. He offered Fort Dallas to
McLaughlin as a shore base for his future expeditions. The
navy lieutenant accepted, and garrisoned the fort with marines. 30
25. Ibid., 274.
26. McLaughlin to SN, October 25, 1841, Off. ltrs.; Captain Martin Burke
to Major Thomas Childs, November 3, 1841, printed in Sprague, Origin,
Progress, and Conclusion of the Florida War, 334-35; Niles’ National
Register, November 20, 1841.
27. McLaughlin to SN, October 30, November 2, 25, 1841, Off. ltrs.
28. McLaughlin to SN, November 27, 1841, with enclosure of memorandum
from William Worth, October 30, 1841, ibid.; McLaughlin to SN, January 17, 1842, ibid.; Marchand to McLaughlin, January 27, 1842, printed
in Sprague, Origin, Progress, and Conclusion of the Florida War, 380.
29. McLaughlin to Worth, December 26, 1841, printed in Sprague, Origin,
Progress, and Conclusion of the Florida War, 380.
30. McLaughlin to SN, January 16, 1842, with enclosure, Worth to McLaughlin, January 3, 1842, Off. ltrs.
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Passed Midshipman George H. Preble commanded the
U.S. Brigantine Jefferson’s four canoes and eighteen men which
composed the second of Lieutenant Rodgers’s three divisions
making up the eastern prong of the navy’s pincer operation.
Preble noted in his diary that the Negro John, his Indian wife
Fanny, his child, and John Tigertail were members of the expedition. Where and when John met Fanny is not recorded in
contemporary military reports, but throughout Preble’s diary
John’s wife was always referred to as “the Indian wife of our
guide.“ 31
John and John Tigertail led Rodgers’s divisions into the
glades on Sunday, February 13, 1842. The sailors paddled north
from the Rio Ratones to New River, and then on to Fort Lauderdale to pick up a guide for the third detachment before moving
into the interior of the Everglades. On the tenth day, John led
them to Lake Okeechobee. Here Rodgers split his force into
smaller units which fanned out to search for the enemy. Fires
were seen in the distance, and fresh tracks were sighted frequently; however, no contact was made with the Seminoles.
Rodgers’s sailors and marines covered the area around Lake
Okeechobee, the northern portion of Big Cypress Swamp, and
the Kissimmee River as far north as Lake Tohopeteliga, putting
the torch to many cultivated fields without encountering any
Seminoles. Finally, John led them down New River to Fort
Lauderdale, and the following day they stood out in their canoes
under canvas to sail down the coast to the anchorage at Key
Biscayne. Midshipman Preble’s crew boarded the Jefferson in the
early afternoon of April 11, 1842, ending a fifty-eight day expedition. 32
Lieutenant John B. Marchand, commanding the Van Buren,
was in charge of the western wing of the pincer, with Chia and
Joe as his guides. Because of the exceptionally low water level
in the Everglades and the discovery of numerous Seminole campsites in the extreme southern section of the glades, his detachment never did link up with Rodgers’s eastern prong. However,
during February and March, Marchand established his base of
31. George H. Preble, “A Canoe Expedition into the Everglades in 1842,”
Tequesta, V (1945), 30-51.
32. Ibid.; John Rodgers to McLaughlin, April 12, 1842, printed in Sprague,
Origin, Progress, and Conclusion of the Florida War, 384-86.
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operations at Fort Henry, an abandoned army post midway
between Cape Sable and Fort Dallas, and from there he and
Lieutenant C. P. R. Rodgers led scouting units out in all directions.
To the east, Second Lieutenant Robert D. Taylor, USMC,
had his Fort Dallas-based marines patroling from the Miami
River westward towards Fort Henry. Further west, around Cape
Sable, Lieutenant James S. Biddle, USN, of the Otsego led a shore
party into the glades in that region. Thus, McLaughlin’s Mosquito Fleet blanketed the Everglades. 33
At the conclusion of these operations the reports of the naval
officers reflected their discouragement over the effort expended
in relation to the enemy contacts encountered. These officers
measured success in terms of military engagements, and it is
apparent that they were not aware that their frequent expeditions
into the glades had imposed a significant change in the life-style
of the Florida Indians. The destruction of the Indians’ crops,
coupled with the numerous superior military units scouring the
Everglades, had forced the Seminoles to disband their war parties
and to live in family groups concentrating on physical survival
to the exclusion of military matters.
The Negro Sampson, who had been held a prisoner for over
two years in the Big Cypress Swamp, reported on the significance
of these incursions into the Everglades. He related what
happened at the great council meeting held in April 1841. About
240 warriors-members of Sam Jones’s, Hospetarke’s, and the
Prophet’s band, along with some Spanish Indians-gathered to
hear their leaders discuss the situation. The scarcity of powder
led to a decision that game must be killed by bow and arrow.
All concurred that the military forces were penetrating every
section of the glades in such numbers that it was no longer safe
in the watery retreat. Sampson added that the Indians had
great respect for the sailors’ canoes which moved about the
swamp with the same facility as their own craft. And finally, it
was agreed that the Seminole nation had been so reduced in
numbers that the only recourse left was to resort to ambush,
fire, and flight. The council’s solution for survival was to split up
33. McLaughlin to SN, March 3, 18, 27, 1842, with enclosures, John B.
Marchand to McLaughlin, February 24, March 23, 1842, Off. ltrs.
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into small family units which could move about continually
without setting up permanent campsites. 34
In other words, the Mosquito Fleet equipped with competent
guides had brought enough pressure into the glades to cause the
Seminoles to disband their war parties and to disperse into family
groups living on the run. It is significant to note that this
council had been held just three months after John’s services had
first been employed.
Before the sailors and marines of the Mosquito Fleet had
commenced their February-April expeditions, Colonel Worth
had been corresponding with Washington to end the war. He
reported that there were only 300 Seminoles left in Florida, a
third of which were warriors. Therefore, he recommended that
the Indians be left alone. It would be impossible to track down
every single one hiding within the Everglades, and the threat
from the Seminoles had been eliminated. The government in
Washington agreed, after seven and a half years of fighting, and
Worth was instructed to terminate his activities.
There had been no formal declaration of war; the cession
was equally as informal. When the colonel detached the Mosquito Fleet from duty in Florida, Lieutenant McLaughlin
brought his vessels into Norfolk on July 19, 1842, to end the
Navy’s role in the Second Seminole War. 35 Obviously the Mosquito Fleet did not bring the war to a close by its actions alone.
Yet the fleet’s operations were more successful than its officers
realized at the time. Within its sphere of operations, the naval
units had a significant impact upon the destruction of the Seminoles’ability to wage war in the Everglades.
34. Sprague, Origin, Progress, and Conclusion of the Florida War, 317-18,
349-50; Sturtevant, “Chakaika and the ‘Spanish Indians,“’ 55.
35. SN to McLaughlin, June 20, 1842, Off., Ships of War; McLaughlin to
SN, July 19, 1842, Off. ltrs.
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